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ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence that during the first year or so of a
worker's tenure, wages rise more slowly than productivity net of training costs
when training is predominantly general and that many employers are, in effect,
induced to share the costs and benefits of general on-the-job training with
their employees. This occurs for three reasons. First, sorting, high job
search costs and the reputational damages that result from premature
separations make a dismissed worker's next best alternative decidedly
unattractive and this causes workers to prefer front loaded compensation
packages which reduce the likelihood of involuntary terminations. Second,
since most young workers are liquidity constrained and cannot afford to self-
finance general training, employers take advantage of their better access to
credit and take over the financing of a portion of the costs of general on-the-
job training. Finally, the minimum wage and union contracts prevent young
workers from agreeing to the low starting wages that would be necessary if they
were to self-finance general on-the-job training.
Analysis of data comparing the growth of compensation to the growth of
productivity net of training costs in jobs reported to involve skills that were
useful at other firms found that during the first two years of tenure that net
productivity grows on average 4 to 5 times faster than compensation. While the
effective specificity of training that is reported to be useful elsewhere
accounts for a portion of this difference, it does not account for all of it.
Consequently, one or more of the forces listed above is probably contributing
to the front-loading of compensation during the first year or so on a job.
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DO EMPLOYERS SHARE THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GENERAL TRAINING?
One of the central propositions of the human capital theory of on-the-job
training is that workers pay for and receive all the benefits of general
training. Since general training raises a worker's ability to be productive in
other organizations as well as the one providing the training, training firms
must pay a wage commensurate with the trained worker's new higher level of
productivity if they are to prevent the loss of their trained workers. Since
the workers, not the firm, get the benefits of the training, "firms [will]
provide general training only if they [do] not have to pay any of the costs"
(Becker 1962 p. 13). Since the training is of value to prospective trainees,
equilibrium in the training market requires that "employees pay for general on-
the-job training by receiving wages below what could be received elsewhere"
(Becker 1962 p. 13) in a job offering no training. Thus, the theory predicts
that when training is general, each worker's wage must equal that worker's
productivity net of training costs (the opportunity costs of the time others
spend training the employee). Since training investments typically diminish
with tenure, wage rates should rise more rapidly than productivity as tenure
increases.
Lazear's (1981) agency model of employment contracts provides still
another reason for expecting very low initial wages which then rise rapidly
with tenure. In jobs where effort is difficult to monitor, this model predicts
that workers are initially paid a wage that is below productivity net of
training costs in order to generate a performance bond. The purpose of this
bond is to insure that anyone fired for shirking suffers a serious loss, one
that is great enough to deter shirking. The employees who are retained by the
firm have this performance bond repaid to them in the form of a wage in the
final period which exceeds the worker's productivity. As a result, wages rise
more rapidly than productivity net of training costs.
This paper presents evidence contradicting the general validity of these
predictions. It argues on both theoretical and empirical grounds that during
the first year or so of a worker's tenure, wages rise more slowly than
productivity net of training costs when training is entirely general. Many
employers are, in effect, induced to share the costs and benefits of general
on-the-job training with their employees. This occurs for three reasons.
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First, sorting, high job search costs and the reputationa1 damages that result
from premature separations make a dismissed worker's next best alternative
decidedly unattractive and this causes workers to prefer front loaded
compensation packages which reduce the likelihood of involuntary terminations.
Second, since most young workers are liquidity constrained and cannot afford to
self-finance general training, employers take advantage of their better access
to credit and take over the financing of a portion of the costs of general on-
the-job training. Finally, the minimum wage and union contracts prevent young
workers from agreeing to the low starting wages that would be necessary if they
were to self-finance general on-the-job training. The first section of the
paper explains why these three factors cause compensation to be front loaded
and evaluates their substantive importance. In the process it provides a
summary of a theory of employer finance of general training that is formally
presented elsewhere (Bishop and Kang 1984, 1988). It proposes to test this
theory by comparing wage growth in the first year of tenure on a job to the
growth of productivity net of training costs. The second section of the paper
reviews previous empirical research comparing rates of growth of wages and
productivity. Section 3 describes a unique data set from which it is possible
to derive estimates of the relative growth rates of wages and productivity net
of training costs early in a worker's tenure at a firm. Section 4 compares
the calculated growth rate of productivity net of training costs to the growth
of real wages with tenure for jobs whose training appears to be predominantly
general. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion of policy
implications.
I. Why are Firms Willing to Share the Costs of General Training?
The Bishop and Kang model is an extension and elaboration of Hashimoto's
elegant theory of the sharing of the costs and benefits of specific training.
It is a two period model in which training costs of C(g,h) are incurred in the
first period and the additional general skills (g) and specific skills (h)
produced by the training become available in the second period. There are two
random elements: (, the stochastic component in the relative utility of
alternative employment and (0, the stochastic component in worker
productivity. Yorkers who leave the firm incur transfer costs of T. At the
end of the training period, the firm dismisses workers whose second period
3productivity, P+g+h+fO, is below the second period wage (W2). Workers quit
their job if the utility of alternative employment (U + f - P+g-T+f) is greater
than W2.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted. sum of profit from two
periods by choosing wage rates in two periods, WI and W2, and the increment in
productivity due to general training, g, and the increment in productivity due
to specific training, h, subject to the constraint that the wage offer and
amount of training are generous enough to attract new hires in a competitive
labor market. The firm's expected profit maximization problem when f and fa
are independent is written as:
(1) Max P
-
C(g,h)
-
WI + 6a[Pr(S)Pr(K)(P +g +h +E(fOIK) .W2)]
g, h, WI, W2
Subject to the constraint
(2) R < WI + ~rPr(S)Pr(K)W2 + (l-Pr(K»U + (l-PR(S»Pr(K)(U+E(fIQ»]
where P is the worker's productivity without training
E(fOIK) is the expected value of fO given that the firm wishes to keep
the worker
E(fIQ) is the conditional expectation of f, the random component in
the utility of alternative employment, given that the worker
quits the firm
6a and 6b are the discount factor of the firm and worker, respectively
6a > 6b'
PreS) is the prior probability the worker is willing to stay with
the firm
Pr(K) is the prior probability the firm is willing to keep the worker
R is the level of expected utility the worker can attain in the
competitive labor market.
Competitive equilibrium implies zero expected profit from the marginal hire.
Manipulating the first order conditions produces the following expressions for
the optimal wage rates:
(3) WI
- P - C(g,h) + 6aPr(S)Pr(K) 8[h +T +E(foIK) -E(fIS)] +~a~b1-
6a7S+6b7K
4(4) W2 - [P+h+g+E(£aIK)] - 8[h + T + E(£a/K) - E(£/S)]
- -1la.::l.bL
6a1S+6b1K
where
8 - Jb:IK-
6a1S+6b1K
is the employer's share of the costs of specific
human capital investments and of quasi rents.
E(£a/K) is the expected value of £a, the random element in second period
productivity, given the firm wishes to keep the worker. E(£aIK»O.
E(£IS) is the conditional expectation of £, the random component of
the utility of employment outside the training firm, given
the worker wishes to stay in the firm. E(£IS) < o.
1K is the proportionate response of the firm's keep rate with
respect to the second period wage times minus one. 1K > O.
1S is the proportionate response of the worker's stay rate with
respect to the second period wage. 1S > O.
Quasi Rents Generated by Sorting. Job Search Costs
and Damaged Reputations
In most matches between a worker and a firm there is a substantial
difference between the average productivity of workers who stick with the firm
and the expected utility of alternative employment of those who wish to stay at
the firm but are nevertheless terminated involuntarily. This difference, the
quasi rent associated with the match, is given by the expression:
(5) Quasi Rent - [h + T + E(£aIK) - E(£/S)]
By sharing these quasi rents, both parties try to induce the other to maintain
the contract. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th terms inside the bracketed expression are
positive and non*trivial in magnitude. Even when training is entirely general
(h-O), this makes it optimal for the firm to pay wages which exceed
productivity minus training costs in the first period and to offer a wage in
the second period which is correspondingly lower than productivity in the
second period. In effect, the firm pays part of the costs of general training
and the rate of wage growth is considerably below the rate of growth of
productivity net of training costs.
The third and fourth terms of the bracketed expression capture the effect
of sorting on the quasi rent. As the worker and the firm learn more about the
quality of the match, the unsuccessful matches tend to be terminated. The
workers who discover that they do not like the job or that they have better
opportunities elsewhere quit and the workers who are the least productive on
5the job are fired or induced to quit. As a result, the average quality of the
match is higher among long tenure workers than among new hiresl. For the jobs
examined in the employer survey analyzed in this paper, this sorting effect has
been estimated to raise average productivity by a minimum of 2.6 percent
between the third and seventeenth month on the job (Bishop 1988).
Another reason why substantial quasi rents inhere in most matches between
worker and firm are the costs of transferring to another firm, T. Transfer
costs include the costs of finding and adjusting to another job, the damage to
the worker and the employer's reputation from premature separations and the
costs of recruiting and selecting a replacement. For most jobs, a worker's
expected transfer costs of finding another job if terminated involuntarily are
considerably larger than the firm's expected costs of recruiting and selecting
a replacement if there is an unanticipated quit. When the small and medium
sized firms surveyed for this paper hired for nonsupervisory positions, they
considered on average only nine applications, interviewed only five of the
applicants and devoted a total of only 10 hours of staff time to the task of
filling one position. They filled new positions an average of 16 days after
beginning the search. In 55 percent of the cases the firm had advance notice
of the opening, so the job was not uncovered during much of the search.
Workers, on the other hand, face very high transfer costs if they are
involuntarily terminated. There are two reasons for this. First, finding
another job takes a great deal of time and is psychologically stressful and
second a discharge does severe damage to a worker's reputation. Involuntarily
terminated workers seldom have another job lined up so they immediately enter
the ranks of the unemployed. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) have calculated that
the expected length of a spell of unemployment was 10.3 weeks in 1980-81 for
the household heads in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data. Using 1974 CPS
data, Clark and Summers (1979) calculated that if unemployed workers did not
leave the labor force, it took on average 12.6 weeks for teenagers to find
another job and 16.2 weeks for those over 20 years of age to find another job.
Blau and Robins' (1985) analysis of longitudinal data from the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Projects found that it took on average 2S to 36 weeks for
unemployed welfare recipients to find a job and 15 to 20 weeks for unemployed
workers not on welfare to find a job. If the termination is a dismissal or a
layoff occurring after only a few months on the job, the individual may not be
6eligible for unemployment insurance. Thus, losing a job generally results in
the loss of between two and six months worth of earnings; a considerably
greater loss than the 10 hours of staff time that are typically devoted to
filling nonsupervisory positions. These costs are the natural consequences of
involuntary turnover. They have not been generated by a Lazear type bonding
contract.
When involuntarily terminated workers find another job, it typically pays
less. In the National Longitudinal Survey, young men who changed employers
between 1967 and 1973 subsequent to an involuntary separation experienced a 3
percent decline in their wage rate over the two year measurement period. For
the mature mens sample the wage decline was 10 percent. These effects appear
to persist for many years. Models were estimated in which dummies for a
separation between 1969 and 1971 were used to predict wage growth during 1967-
69 and 1971-73 as well as for 1969-71. The workers who were involuntarily
terminated between 1969 and 1971 experienced a sharp deceleration in their wage
growth which persisted into 1971-73 (Bartel and Borjas 1981). Analyzing a five
year time interval in PSID data, Ruhm (1987) found that involuntary
terminations lowered the wage growth of male heads of household by 13.6 percent
but had no significant effect on the wage growth of female heads of household.
The wage reductions experienced by involuntarily terminated workers arise
partly because the individual's specific human capital is now worthless, partly
because of Lazear type bonding contracts (if they do indeed exist) and partly
because a dismissal is a signal which severely damages a worker's reputation.
The unemployment durations and wage reductions reported above are for all
involuntarily terminated workers as a group. While no study reported separate
estimates of the effects of discharges and layoffs, one suspects that those
discharged experience longer spells of unemployment and bigger wage declines
than those laid off. Prior to making a final hiring decision, most employers
contact a job candidate's previous employers and are, consequently, likely to
find out about the discharge. If the job seeker does not include the employer
who discharged him in his employment history, there is a long stretch of
nonemployment that must somehow be explained. Discharged employees are
reported to be 25 percent less productive during their 2nd and 3rd month of
employment than the workers who end up staying with a firm for a year or more
(Bishop 1988). In some cases this productivity disadvantage is specific to the
7match, but it is difficult for other employers to assess whether that is the
case so if they know a job applicant was fired by a previous employer, they are
unlikely to hire him/her.
Since the costs of a discharge are so severe, job seekers would be
expected to prefer employers and employment contracts which minimize risks of
discharge and layoff and which promise that bad recommendations will not be
given. Promises not to give bad oral recommendations are not enforceable,
however, so workers seek contracts which minimize the risk of dismissal and
layoff. Seniority protection, grievance procedures and enforceable promises to
dismiss a worker only after certain procedures are followed are one way to
accomplish this but in nonunion settings there are always ways of forcing an
unwanted employee out. A more reliable way of reducing the risk of dismissal
and layoff is to have the employer put up a bond which is forfeited if the
worker is laid off or dismissed. Workers, therefore, prefer employment
contracts containing a front loaded compensation package in which the employer
pays most of the costs of specific training and contributes toward the costs of
general training when training is general rather than specific. There are, of
course, countervailing forces such as the desire to reduce the number of
trained employees who quit and to reduce shirking, so the form of the contract
depends on how the various forces balance out in equation 3 and 4.
The magnitude of quasi rents vary across workers so the supply of trained
labor with respect to their wage is not infinitely elastic. Consequently,
while preventing other firms from hiring away trained labor is an important
objective in setting the second period wage, there is room for other factors to
playa role as well (Glick and Feuer 1984). The other factors that can now
influence the wage profile are differential access to capital markets and
constraints on wage setting due to unions and wage minimums.
The Effects of Workers Being Liquidity Constrained
The second force tending to lower wage growth below the growth of
productivity net of training costs is the fact that most workers receiving
substantial amounts of general training discount the future much more heavily
than their employers. This force is represented by the term on the far right
hand side of equations 3 and 4 where it results in 6a-6b > O. Most young
workers (the ones who have the greatest need for general training) are
liquidity constrained--that Is they are unable to shift as much consumption
8from the future into the present as they would like because they have neither
assets which could be depleted nor access to credit at reasonable terms. Half
of households headed by someone under the age of 25 have less than $746 in
financial assets and 19 percent have no financial assets at all. Half of
households headed by someone between 25 and 34 have less than $1514 in
financial assets and 13 percent have none (Survey of Consumer Finances 1984).
Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance on-the-job
training and banks will not lend money for this purpose without collateral.
Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some but only
34 percent of households with heads under the age of 35 own a home and many of
the houses have been owned for only a short while so the equity that can be
borrowed against is small. Even with collateral, the loans available to
individuals usually carry higher interest rates than those charged businesses.
Studies of the willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over time
have all concluded that the intertempora1 elasticity of substitution is no
higher than one and most studies conclude it is .5 or below (Friend and Blume
1975; Hall 1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A substitution elasticity of .5
implies that reducing a liquidity constrained worker's wage by one half (in
order to pay for general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal
utility of consumption. Such a worker would be willing to give up four dollars
of future income in return for one dollar of current income. The liquidity
constraint phenomenon has little effect on the wage profile of jobs requiring
no training and which, therefore, have a flat productivity profile. Where
significant general training is occurring, however, it comes into play and
results in an employment contract in which the employer shares the costs of
general training.2
In addition, the progressive nature of the personal income tax means that
workers often face higher marginal tax rates on the fruits of training
investments than they are paying when they incur the costs of such investments.
Firms, on the other hand, train continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced
when the costs of training are incurred and expensed are no different from
those faced during the payoff period. These two factors result in firms being
more willing than workers to trade off future earnings for present earnings.
The compensation packages that result from the asymmetric access to capital
markets and the progressive tax structure reflect the worker's strong
9preference for compensation now rather than later. In effect, firms offer new
hires a loan that will be canceled if a separation occurs. Firms do not
require repayment of the loan when separations occur for the same reasons that
banks do not offer large unsecured loans without a government guarantee of
payment. The administrative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely high
and bankruptcy is a real option for someone with zero assets.
Constraints on Wage Setting: Legal and Contractual
The third force that tends to lower wage growth below the growth of
productivity net of training costs is legal and contractual constraints on the
starting wage rate. For entry level jobs obtained by young workers, the
minimum wage is an important source of such rigidity in the United States and
in those European countries with similar legislation (Hashimoto 1982). In
European countries that have lower minimum wages for youth (eg. Netherlands) or
no governmental legislation (eg. Germany) and in adult jobs where legislated
minimums are not a binding constraint, collective bargaining agreements are an
alternative mechanism for mandating a flat wage profile. Most unions appear to
prefer flat wage profiles. The motive might be to maintain solidarity between
workers or to restrict access to the occupation by discouraging the provision
of general occupational training. The reasons for a collective worker
preference for flat wage profiles is not analyzed, the desire is treated as an
exogenous constraint on the structure of an optimal contract.
Thus, the BishopfKang model offers three different reasons why employers
may share the costs and benefits of general training and therefore why wages
may rise less rapidly during the first year on the job than productivity net of
training costs when training is entirely general. The theory of general on-
the-job training predicts, instead, that when training is entirely general (ie.
h-O), wages will rise at the same rate as productivity net of training costs.
The Salop/Salop (1976) and Nickell (1976) adverse selection models predict that
wages will rise at the same rate as productivity net of training costs even
when much of training is specific to the firm3. Agency theory goes even
further and predicts that wages will grow more rapidly than productivity net of
training costs when training is entirely general. Consequently, a comparison
of these growth rates is a natural and powerful way to test the efficacy of
these competing theories. This paper provides such a comparison of wage and
productivity net of training cost growth rates during the first year on the job
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for a sample of 1493 workers hired by small and medium sized establishments
during 1980 and 1981. The next section of the paper reviews previous empirical
research on the subject.
II. Previous Research on the Effects of
Tenure on Productivity and Wages.
Medoff and Abraham (1981) were the first to analyze data in which it is
possible to compare the growth of wages and productivity with tenure. Using
micro-data on long tenure employees from the personnel records of four large
U.S. corporations, Medoff and Abraham found that, within a grade level,
experience was positively associated with wage rates but negatively associated
with performance ratings. They concluded that, "under the assumption that
rated performance is a valid indicator of relative productivity, our results
imply that a substantial fraction of the return to experience among the groups
we are studying is unrelated to productivity" (p. 187). Medoff and Abraham
also reviewed a number of other studies and concluded that the association
between seniority in a job and productivity is curvilinear. During the initial
very short orientation/training period there was a positive association. Once
this training period was over, however, there tended to be a negative
association between tenure and productivity among those who occupy a particular
job (i.e., have not been promoted to greater responsibility). Almost all the
studies were conducted in large corporations and almost all of the workers
included in these studies had many years of tenure at the firm. These findings
suggest that Lazear's agency model is one of the explanations of the rise of
wage rates with tenure at large firms once the initial 1-5 year learning period
is comp1eted4.
.
It is not clear, however, that the finding that wages rise more rapidly
than productivity extends to small firms or to workers with only a year or so
of tenure. Small firms are significantly different from large firms. Turnover
is higher in small firms and more contingent on performance so the sorting
explanation of wage and productivity growth should be more relevant to small
firms than to large firms (Bishop 1988). Monitoring problems are not as severe
at small firms so Lazear's agency theory explanation for backloading
compensation is less applicable at these firms. Reinforcing this is the fact
that small firms do not have well established reputations which might be
11
damaged by reneging on a Lazear type bonding contract. As a result, workers
may be reluctant to enter into such contracts with small firms. The
circumstances are also different in the first year of employment for turnover
is higher, training is greater and productivity is rising rather than falling.
In fact, there is an abundance of evidence that in the first few months on
a job, productivity rises dramatically while wages are rising only modestly.
Industrial engineers have found that the learning curve for many jobs is such
that new hires make almost no contribution to output for many weeks and often
take a year or more to reach the productivity standard (King 1964, Talbot and
Ellis 1969). If all this learning were firm specific and employers financed
all of its costs, this pattern might be consistent with standard theory. But
standard models of the sharing of the costs of specific training do not predict
that employers pay all of its costs and, indeed, adverse selection theory
predicts that employers pay none of the costs of specific training. The
specific training explanation of the flat wage profile is particularly suspect
when to all outward appearances much of the training is useful at other firms
(as it is when a new secretary spends the first few weeks on a job learning
Word Perfect, a word processing program used by many other employers).
Studies of who pays the costs of apprenticeship training in three
different nations--Germany, Great Britain, and the United States--all
contradict the claim that employers will not share in the costs of general
training ( Noll et al 1984; Ryan 1980; Jones 1985; Weiderhold-Fritz 1985).
Despite the transferable character of the training and high turnover rates,
these studies concluded that employers made large investments that were not
recovered during the apprenticeship. A welding apprenticeship program at a
major U.S. shipyard was the subject of the first of these studies (Ryan 1980).
The wage profile was quite flat--starting at $3.99 and topping out at $5.26
after about two years on the job--even though the investments in general
training were very considerable. Inexperienced new hires spent 36 days in
vestibule training before beginning work. During the first week following
vestibule training, the trainee's output net of repair requirements was less
than 10 percent of an experienced worker's output. Thirty-seven weeks after
being hired it reached a level of 55 percent and at 60 weeks a level of 80
percent of an experienced workers output. Despite the fact that the local
economy was in deep recession, monthly separation rates were extremely high:
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10.8 percent for beginners and 6.3 percent for those with 12 to 24 months of
tenure. The shipyard accounted for about one-fifth of the welding jobs in the
area. When trained welders left the shipyard, they typically found better
paying welding jobs at other local employers. This evidence clearly
establishes that the shipbuilding company was contributing to the costs of
general training.
The study of German apprenticeship training by the Bundersinstitut fur
Berufsforschung found that in 1980 training costs ranged from a high of 25,200
DM per year for telecommunications technician apprentices to 2400 DM for
apprentice gardeners and averaged 10,300 DM or $5668 per year at 1980 exchange
rates. The apprentice's contribution to output, which was netted out to arrive
at the above figure, averaged 6700 DM per year (Weiderhold-Fritz 1985).
Jones's (1985) study of apprentice training in the engineering industry in
Great Britain found that the employer's training costs were 1.31 times the
annual payroll costs of a skilled worker and the apprentice's contribution to
output (which was netted out in calculating the estimate of employer costs) was
1.26 times the payroll costs of a skilled worker. Thus even major upward
revisions of these estimates of the apprentice's contribution to output would
not change the basic conclusion that employers appear to be sharing the costs
of general training. While the German and British studies have large enough
samples to make generalizations possible, a case study of one occupation at one
firm is much too small a data base for generalizations about the u.s. This
paper tests whether Ryan's finding that employers appear to share the costs of
general on-the-job training can be replicated in a larger and more
representative sample of u.s. jobs.
III. Data
An employer survey sponsored by the National Institute of Education and
the National Center for Research in Vocational Education conducted between
February and June 1982 provides the basis for our test of these theories. Each
of the 3412 surveyed employers was asked a series of questions about "the last
new employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that
person is still employed by your company." In order to minimize problems of
recall and of adjusting actual starting wage rates for inflation since the date
of hire, the sample employed in this paper is a subset of 1493 employers who
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hired someone after July 1980 and answered all the questions about wage
rates ,productivity and training. Most of the respondents were the
owners/managers of the small establishments (70 percent had fewer than 50
employees) who were quite familiar with the performance of each of the firm's
employees.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate
supervisor) to report on productivity of the typical individual-hired in the
job after 2 weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the end of 2 years at the
firm. The supervisor was asked to do the rating on a "scale of zero to 100
where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees in
(NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your
employee." For the full data set at the mean values of these indexes of
reported productivity were 49.0 for the first 2 weeks, 64.6 for the next 11
weeks and 81.4 at the time of the interview. The questions asking for a rating
of the productivity of particular workers had remarkably low 4.4 percent
nonresponse rate.6,
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees
do not measure productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are not
comparable across firms or across jobs in a firm. Rather, they are intended as
ratio scale indicators of the relative productivity of individual workers at
different points in time. This is a crucial assumption and the sensitivity of
results to changes in this assumption will be carefully examined. If these
productivity indexes are proportional transformations of true productivity plus
a random error, percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index
will be unbiased estimators of percentage differences in true productivity. If
the variations in the productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate
the proportionate variations in the true productivity, our estimates of
percentage increases in productivity during the first year on the job will be
biased downward. Even though it is possible for a worker's true productivity
to be negative, the scale was defined as having a lower limit of zero. Floors
and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be negatively
correlated with the true value. If this is the case, our estimates of
percentage increases in productivity during the first year will be biased
downward. In our view, this latter type of bias is more likely than the
former. 7 The sensitivity of the main findings concerning the proportionality
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assumption will be tested by presenting estimates of the growth of productivity
net of training costs that are based on 3 alternative assumptions:
proportionate differences in productivity are in fact 50 percent of those
reported, equal to those reported and 150 percent of those reported.
Data were also obtained on the amount of time that is devoted to four
different kinds of training activities during the first 3 months on the job. A
training time index was constructed by first valuing trainer and trainee time
relative to that of workers with two years of tenure in that job and then
combining the time invested in training activities during the first 3 months on
the job.8
IV. Results
The key issue is how the growth rates of wages and productivity net of
training cost compare when training is predominantly general. Consequently, a
measure of the generality of training is needed so that the sample of jobs for
hypothesis testing can be limited to those which provide a great deal of
general training. The question which provides us with such a measure is, "How
many of the skills learned by new employees in this job are useful outside this
company?" Fifty-nine percent responded "almost all," 13 percent responded
"most," and only 7.5 percent answered "almost none." The employers were next
asked how many other local firms made use of the general skills that were
developed in their training. The jobs that offer the most general skill
training are defined to be those reported to have "almost all" of their skills
useful at other firms and 16 or more other firms in the local labor market that
in fact use these skills. Data for these jobs are presented in the first
column of table 1. The second column presents data for the jobs where almost
all of the training was useful in other firms, but here the number of such
firms in the locality was small enough (below 16) to suggest that employers
might have some monopsony power. The groupings for the other three columns are
based only on the generality of the skills developed without regard to the size
of the local market for these skills.
The first two rows of the table present estimates of the real wage
increase in the first one or two years at the job. The starting wage is for a
period averaging 13 months prior to the interview, so real wage increases were
calculated by dividing the actual wage increases reported for the sampled new
hires by 1.071, the increase in the economy wide hourly wage (excluding
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overtime) between April 1981 and Kay 1982. Jobs which offer training in skills
which are at least in part useful at other firms appear to command real wage
increases of only 5 to 6 percent in the first year and 2 to 6 percent in the
second year at the job (see columns 1 to 4). The increase in the real wage is
much smaller (essentially zero for the two year wage growth figure) in the jobs
involving highly specific skills (see column 5). Thus, jobs offering general
training do have higher rates of real wage growth than jobs offering only
specific training, as predicted by theory. We now turn to the related issue of
whether the real wage growth that occurs in jobs offering considerable general
training is as large as is predicted by standard theory?
[Table 1 about here}
The percentage increases in productivity during the first two years at the
job reported in lines 3 and 4 of Table 1 are quite large. The gain in
productivity was 26 to 30 percent during the first three months (between an
initial average for the first two weeks and an average for weeks 3 through 13)
and another 19 to 25 percent by the end of the second year at the job. The
productivity gains were largest in jobs with training that developed skills of
some generality. The increase in the worker's reported productivity is clearly
considerably greater than the 8 to 12 percent increase in the worker's real
wage during the first two years at these jobs. This occurs even at the jobs in
which training was reported to be almost entirely general and for which there
are many local firms that also need the skills in question.
Lines 5 through 9 of Table 1 report answers to questions about the number
of hours devoted to four distinct training activities. During the first three
months, training for jobs with the most general training and many local
competitors involved an average of 49 hours watching others do the job, 9.6
hours in formal training, 52 hours in informal training by management, and 25.6
hours in ,informal training by co-workers. The time devoted to training had a
value equivalent to 147 hours of an already trained co-worker's time or about
28.3 percent of the output that a co-worker would produce in 3 months. As long
as some of the skills taught are general, the required training time seems
unrelated to the reported degree of generality. However, jobs reported to
teach almost no skills useful in other firms required less training --118
rather than 147 hours in the first 3 months.
Line 10 of the table presents the average costs of training in the first
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hires were 26 percent less productive than workers with 2 years of tenure, they
were not factoring into that calculation the fact that about 11 percent of the
new hire's time was spent in a training activity which produced virtually no
output. Under these assumptions, the calculated logarithmic increase in
productivity net of training costs for jobs with the most general training is
51 percent which is 6 times the corresponding increase in real wages [51/8.3].
The estimates reported in lines 14 through 16 of the table make the more
conservative assumption that there was double counting--that the lower
productivity reported for new workers reflects in part the portion of their
time that was devoted to formal training and watching others do the work.
Line 14 was obtained by substituting line 11 for line 10 in the calculation
described in the previous paragraph. Under these more conservative
assumptions, the logarithmic growth of productivity net of training costs is 44
percent in the jobs requiring the most general training or 5 times the rate of
increase of real wages.
The sensitivity of these estimates to changes in assumptions about the
scaling of the productivity index can be examined by comparing line 14 to lines
15 and 16. Line 15 of the table presents estimates that are based on the
assumption that the reports of productivity differences supplied by our
respondents exaggerate true proportionate differences in productivity by a
factor of two. This assumption implies that the coefficient of variation of
productivity of job incumbents is 6.5 percent, not the 13 percent that our
respondents reported it to be and not the 19 percent that studies using hard
data on output have found on average. Even under this very extreme assumption,
productivity net of training costs for the most general jobs still grows three
times faster than the real wage--25.4 percent rather than 8.3 percent. Line 16
of the table presents estimates that are based on the assumption that
proportionate differences in true productivity between new and experienced
workers are 50 percent greater than those reported (ie. that the coefficient of
variation is 19.5). Under these assumptions, the growth of net productivity in
jobs with the most general training is 8 times greater than the growth of wage
rates.
Tests of our central hypothesis
-- that productivity net of training costs
rise more rapidly than compensation during the first 2 years of tenure even in
the jobs with the most general training -- are presented in table 2. The null
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hypothesis actually tested was: Is the ratio of productivity net of training
cost in the first 3 months to productivity net of training cost at the end of 2
years, NPQl/NP2yr, equal to or greater than the ratio of hourly compensation at
these 2 points in time, RCQl/RC2yr? The hypothesis was tested under different
maintained assumptions about double counting and the scaling of relative
productivity. The estimate of the ratio of real compensation at the start to
real compensation after two years was the inverse of the exp(.083) (from line 2
of Table 1 adjusted for differences between the growth rates of wages and
compensation.
The first'column of table 2 reports hypothesis tests that are conditional
on the maintained assumption that compensation grows 1 percent less than wages
during the first two years (possibly because the value of medical benefits does
not increase in the second year of employment). The second column of the table
reports hypothesis tests under a maintained assumption that compensation rises
4 percent faster than wage rates during the first 2 years on a job (possibly
because new employees are not eligible for paid vacation or sick leave until
they have been at the firm for a whole year)lO. An offer of two weeks of paid
vacation raises the effective wage by four percent, so a firm which offers 2
weeks of paid vacation to employees with 2 years of tenure but none to new
hires effectively raises the growth of compensation 4 percent above the growth
of wages. This is not very common so it would appear that 4 percent is an
upper bound on the differential between the growth of compensation and wages
during the first two years on a job.
[Table 2 about here]
The t-statistics reported in the table imply a decisive rejection of the
hypothesis that in jobs involving training in skills almost all of which
reported to be useful at other firms that compensation rises at a rate that is
greater than or equal to the rise in productivity net of training costs. This
is a robust finding. Even when all of the maintained assumptions are selected
to favor the hypothesis--compensation increases 4 percent faster than wage
rates in the first two years on the job, conservative assumptions are made
regarding double counting, and the true increase in relative productivity with
tenure is only half of the amount reported by our respondents--, the hypothesi
is rejected by a wide margin.
Clearly, during the first year or so on a job, wages grow much more slowl
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than productivity net of training costs even in the jobs where most of the
skills being developed by training are useful at other firms. Some of the gap
between the growth of productivity net of training costs and wages is a
consequence of specific training. Even when skills developed by training are
all useful in other firms, the package of skills is nevertheless more valuable
at the training firm than at other firms. This is because each firm requires a
different mix of general skills. The firm that does the training concentrates
on those skills it needs the most, some of which may not be as highly valued by
alternative employers. Skills that would be highly valued by an alternative
employer may not be taught because others on the staff already fulfill that
function. In other cases, later employers may not be aware of the skills that
were developed and consequently not assign the worker to a job that makes use
of them. The result is that the best fit between a worker's skills and hisjher
job is generally at the firm that did the training. Even when a worker's next
job makes use of the general skills learned, there is no guarantee that new
hires with better than average skills will be offered comparably higher entry
wages. These phenomena have the effect of transforming training which the
employer honestly believes develops skills that are useful at other firms into
training which is in part effectively specific to the firm. To the extent
training is effectively specific, wages will rise more slowly than productivity
net of training cost.
But the discrepancies between wage and productivity growth are too large
to be explained by specific training alone. Using conservative assumptions
regarding double counting, the increase in productivity net of training costs
was calculated to be 43.9 percent. Given this increase in the worker's net
productivity, Table 3 presents estimates of the wage increase that is implied
by a standard Becker model of OJT in which training is partially specific and
the costs and benefits of specific training are shared. The only set of
assumptions that can produce the observed 8.3 percent wage increase is that 90
percent of the training was specific and that 90 percent of the costs of
specific training were financed by the employer. The upper bound on the
discrepancy between growth rates of compensation and wage rates was 4 percent,
so the upper bound on the increase in compensation during the first two years
of tenure is 12.2 percent. For the standard model to generate a 12.2 percent
increase in compensation, it must be assumed either that 90 percent of traini1
Table 2
T-TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PRODUCTIVITY
NET OF TRAINING COSTS RISES FASTER THAN COMPENSATION
Compensation Rises
Measurement Assumptions
1 , less
than wages
4 , more
than wages
No Double Counting 18.5 15.2
Conservative Double Counting Assumptions
Reported Productivity is Proportional
to True plus Error 17.6 14.6
True Gain is Half Reported Gain 12.2 8.6
The tabulations and hypothesis tests were done using end of period levels as
the base for defining rates of change. This is necessitated by the fact that
productivity net of training costs during the first quarter is zero or
negative in some jobs. The null hypothesis was (NPQl/NP2yr) -(RCQl/RC2yr)~ O.
Where NP - net productivity and RC - real compensation. The hypothesis tests
make the conservative assumption that growth rates of productivity and real
compensation are independent. The sample is the same as the one producing
Column 1 of Table 1.
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is specific and employers pay 80 percent of its costs or that 80 percent of
training is specific and employers pay 90 percent of its costs. For training
which was reported to be developing skills almost all of which were useful at
other firms, these assumptions seem implausible. If so, the slow growth of
wages in the first two years must have another contributing cause and some
employers must, therefore, be sharing the costs and benefits of general
training with their employees.
[Table 3 about here]
V. Summary and Conclusions
Becker's statement that the employee must always pay the full costs of
general on-the-job training is apparently often not true. A number of forces
have been identified which make it profitable for employers to front load
compensation and thereby share the costs of general training: (1) liquidity
constraints which prevent workers from financing their own general training
without unacceptably large reductions in consumption, (2) sources of job-worker
match specificity unrelated to training such as sorting, costs of finding a new
job and the reputational damages of turnover and (3) legal and contractual
constraints on the starting wage. Analysis of data comparing the growth of
compensation to the growth of productivity net of training costs in jobs
reported to involve skills that were useful at other firms found that during
the first two years of tenure that net productivity grows on average 4 to 5
times faster than compensation. If the focus had been on only the first few
months of tenure, the multiple by which the growth of net productivity exceeds
wage growth would have been even larger. While the effective specificity of
training that is reported to be useful elsewhere accounts for a portion of thif
difference, it does not account for all of it. Consequently, one or more of
the forces listed above is probably contributing to the front-loading of
compensation during the first year or so on a job. The forces that work in th
opposite direction.-the need to design wage structures to attract those with
low quit probabilities and to have the new hire put up a performance bond so ;
to reduce shirking--appear to be a good deal weaker. The oft repeated
complaint that other employers are poaching one's trained workers may in fact
be legitimate.
If these conclusions are true, turnover becomes a much more important
41.2 38.4 35.7 34.0
38.4 32.9 27.4 24.2
35.7 27.4 19.2 14.3
34.0 24.2 14.3 8.3
Table 3
WAGE INCREASES PREDICTED
BY THE
STANDARD MODEL OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
(Net Productivity rises 43.9 percent)
Share of Skills Develo~ed that are Firm Specific
Share of Specific
Training Funded
by Fi rms
25 , 50 , 75 % 90%
25 %
90 %
50 %
75 %
Note: The standard model's predicted wage increase is equal to
43.9*[ 1 - (share skills firm specific)(share funded by firm)].
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determinant of training investments than previously thought. In the standard
model, a worker's propensity for turnover influences the amount of specific
training supplied but not the amount of general training that is undertaken.
If employers are financing some of the costs of general training, however,
worker's with high turnover propensities are likely to find it hard to obtain
jobs that offer general as well as specific training. Institutional barriers
to the free flow of information about job applicants--such as EEO testing
guidelines, the reluctance of high schools to send out transcripts and the
threat of suit if bad recommendations are given--raise turnover and thereby
lower the incentive to invest in both general and specific training. The high
rates of turnover of American youth probably help explain why investments in
general on-the-job training are lower in this country than in Japan and Germany
where turnover rates are considerably lower. To the extent that liquidity
constraints, progressive income taxes and legal and union imposed minimums for
the wage rate during training are responsible for employers taking over some of
the financing of general training, economy wide investment in general on-the-
job training is almost certainly lowered. The other possible cause of front
loaded compensation packages--high costs of transition--has the opposite
effect. High transition costs lower turnover, and this in turn raises the
payoff to employer investments in both specific and general training.
-"
--'-.
.......-
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FOOTNOTES
1. The sorting effect may be thought of as the return to investment in
information about the quality of the match. The firm learns about the
trainability and productivity of the employee and the worker learns about
conditions of work, the friendliness of coworkers and the quality of
supervision and training and about hisjher talent and taste for the work.
After this information generates some separations, the employer and remaining
workers receive a return on their investment in match specific knowledge.
2. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his
1962 paper. "Since employer specific skills are part of the intangible assets
or good will of firms and can be offered as collateral along with tangible
assets, capital would be more readily available for specific than for general
investments (p.42)." He did not, however, explicitly analyze how such
constraints might influence the tenure profile of wages and thus induce
employers to share the costs of general training.
3. In the adverse selection models of Salop and Salop (1976) and Nickell
(1976) workers have information not available to firms on how likely they are
to quit, so since turnover is costly, some employers attempt to attract those
with low quit probabilities by imposing a hiring fee (through a below market
starting wage) and raising the wage level in subsequent periods. The
equilibrium wage pattern results in the worker paying all the costs and
receiving all the benefits of investments in specific human capital and in wage
rates which rise in step with gains in productivity net of training costs.
4. Medoff and Abraham's findings, however, do have alternative explanations.
The data available to Medoff and Abraham provided measures of productivity and
wage rates. The theories being tested, however, specify a relationship between
productivity net of training costs and compensation. The least tenured workers
in a particular employment grade are likely to be those who have been recently
promoted into the job and/or are likely to be shortly promoted into a higher
grade. As a result, they are probably getting more intensive training than the
older, more tenured workers in that employment grade. This means that even
though productivity may be negatively correlated with tenure within an
employment grade, productivity net of training costs (production minus the
value of the time that others spend training the individual) may be positivelY
correlated with tenure within employment grade. The other possible hole in the
Medoff and Abraham argument is that workers with vested pension rights and many
years of tenure may find that the present value of their pension benefits is
declining as they postpone retirement. If this were the case, total real
compensation of workers who are not being promoted as they approach retirement
might be falling. The analysis conducted in this paper explicitly accounts for
training costs and possible differences between rates of growth of wages and
compensation.
5. The survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of
employers located in 28 groups of counties scattered around the country. The
sample was drawn from lists of establishments paying unemployment insurance
taxes that were stratified by size and industry. Because the original survey
was designed to evaluate the labor market effects of welfare reform proposals,
'both large establishments and establishments in industries with a high
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proportions of low wage workers were over sampled. The sample under represents
workers who are employed at large establishments. The second wave attempted to
conduct a telephone interview with all the respondents in the first-wave survey
and achieved a 70 percent response rate.
6. Comparably defined nonresponse rates for other questions about the new hire
were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2 percent for age, 6.7 for
education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by a supervisor, and
5.7 percent for a 3-question sequence from which starting wage rate is
calculated. The low nonresponse rate implies that our respondents felt that
they were capable of making such judgments and augurs well for the quality of
the data that results.
7. Further support for the proposition that the proportionality assumption
results in an understatement of percentage increases in productivity with
tenure comes from comparing the coefficients of variation of productivity in
this and other data sets. If pairs of workers who are still at the firm are
used to construct a coefficient of variation for this data set, it averages .13
for sales clerks, clerical, service and semi-skilled blue collar workers. This
estimate of the coefficients of variation is smaller than the estimates of the
coefficients of variation for yearly output derived from analysis of objective
ratio scale measures of output. These estimates were .265 for sales clerks,
.14 for semi-skilled blue collar workers, .167 for workers in routine clerical
jobs, .255 in clerical jobs requiring decion making and .206 in service
occupations (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means that the estimates
of percentage growth rates of productivity during the first year on the job
reported in this paper are probably conservative.
8. The opportunity costs of the time of management staff members who provided
formal and informal training were assumed to be 1.5 times the opportunity cost
of the time of co-workers providing such training. Based on the mean values of
the productivity index the trainee's time was valued at 80 percent of the
opportunity cost of an experienced coworker's time. When supervisors and
coworkers are giving informal training to a new employee, the trainee is almost
invariably involved directly in a production activity. Employers report that
for informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while being
trained as they are when working alone (Hollenbeck and Smith 1985).
Consequently, informal training time is assumed to involve only the investment
of the trainer's time. The training time index is equal to 0.8 times the hours
spent watching others do the job plus 1.8 times the hours in formal training
plus 1.5 times the hours in training by management plus hours in training by
co-workers. The cost of the trainer was assumed to be two-thirds of the
foregone productivity, since formal training often involves more than one
trainee. Thus, 1.8 - (2/3)1.5 + .8. The index was constructed under an
assumption that the four training activities were mutually exclusive. This
implies that if the sum of the hours devoted to individual activities is
greater than 520, that a reporting error has occurred which overstates
investment in training. In the few cases where the sum of hours devoted to
training exceeded 520, the training time index was adjusted downward by the
ratio of 520 to the sum of the hours reported for individual activities. This
procedure reduces the mean of the index by about 10 percent.
24
9. When the ratio derived from the 1983 survey is multiplied by the 1982
estimate of value of training in the first 3 months, we estimate that workers
with 2 years of tenure spend 5.5 percent of their time in formal training or
watching others do the work and that the time others spend training him or her
has a value of 9.5 percent of his or her productivity. One minus this latter
figure is the appropriate correction factor for the denominator when
conservative aggregation assumptions are used. For liberal assumptions the
appropriate correction factor is one minus the sum of these two figures.
10. If a new hire is not approaching retirement age, the fact that most
pensions do not vest until many years of service are accumulated has little
impact on the rate of growth of total (including pension savings) compensation
during the first two years of employment at the firm. For workers who plan to
stay at the firm until retirement, pension accruals are a relatively constant
share of earnings. Yorkers who leave shortly after the pension vests do not
get an asset of great value for they will have to wait many decades before
benefits are paid and the level of the pension depends upon current earnings
not their earnings just before retirement (McDermed, Clark and Allen 1987).
Yorkers who intend to leave before the pension vests have no pension accruals.
Since 69 percent of the new hires in the sample are under 30 and 86 percent
under 40, adding pension savings to wages to construct an estimate of full
compensation results in only a small (less than .5 percent) increase in the
calculated growth of compensation in the first two years.
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